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It is argued that the hard problem of consciousness, i.e. the fact that we have experience,
stems from a conceptual confusion between consciousness and experience. It is concluded that
experience has to be considered as a basic characteristic of ongoing interactions at even the
most simple level, while consciousness is better defined as reflexive awareness, possible since
symbolic language was developed.
A dynamic evolutionary point of view is proposed to make more appropriate distinctions
between experience, awareness and consciousness. Experience can be defined as a
characteristic linked closely to specific pattern matching, a characteristic which is already
apparent at the molecular level at least. Awareness then can be regarded as the special
experience of one or more central, final modules in the animal neuronal brain. From
evolutionary considerations, awareness can be understood functionally and physiologically.
As such, awareness is what experience is to animals.
Finally, consciousness could be defined as reflexive awareness, instead of using the term as
synonymous to awareness. The ability for reflexive awareness is distinctly different from
animal and human awareness and depends upon the availability of a separate frame of
reference, as provided by symbolic language. As such, words have made reflexive awareness -
a specific and infrequent form of awareness - possible. Conciousness might be defined as the
experience evoked by considering, i.e. thinking about experiences themselves.
Explaining and understanding awareness and consciousness as evolved biological
characteristics of the functioning of animals and later humans, poses no philosophical
problems. The nature of experience itself remains elusive, but this is not a problem specific to
EAC http://users.ugent.be/~mvaneech/EAC.html
1 of 22 16/10/2012 16:14
awareness or consciousness. If there is a hard problem of explaining consciousness, than this
actually must be considered as the hard problem of explaining experience. While the
definition of experience could be broadened to include all molecular and biological pattern
specific recognition events, the true nature of consciousness might be better understood when
considering it as a very specific form of awareness, made possible by language.
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1.     Insightful understanding often depends on definitions, as is expressed in the following
quote:
"The increase of conceptual clarity of a theory through careful clarifications and specifications
is, as William Whewell observed more than a century ago, one of the most important ways in
which science progresses. He called this process "the explication of conceptions" and showed
how a number of theories, in the course of their temporal careers, had become increasingly
precise - largely as a result of the critics of such theories emphasizing their conceptual
unclarities. Many important scientific revolutions ... have depended largely on the recognition,
and subsequent reduction, of the terminological ambiguity of theories." (Laudan, 1977).
Indeed, it is usually overlooked how our definitions and how the terminology we use direct
our thinking, and often guide us into narrow dead end alleys obstructing what are often
straightforward insights.
2. Recently, many of the discussions about consciousness have centered around the hard
problem of consciousness or have dealt with the question whether there is something hard at
all about consciousness to be explained. To me, as a biologist with interests in general
information and evolution theory, it appears that most of these discussions actually are about
the problem of explaining what experience might be. So, the usage of the terms "experience,
awareness and consciousness" as synonyms, obstructs constructive discussion and leads to a
confusion of what may be different concepts.
3. I will try to show that explaining experience is a more general problem, not directly linked
to understanding what awareness and consciousness are about. Experience itself might be
treated and better understood as a general concept already apparent at the molecular level,
while one might consider awareness and consciousness then just those kinds of experiences
which become possible respectively with the development of brains in animals and of
symbolic language in humans. The fact that both awareness and consciousness themselves are
also experiences, leads to confusion about their being hard problems to be explained, while
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the eventual hard problem is already intrinsic to the 'phenomenon' of experience itself.
4. One then might accept that there is something irreducible about experience since it is an
intrinsic characteristic of material interaction, of our universe, while on the other hand one can
easily agree with the claim that consciousness is explained (or explainable). While this
manuscript was in preparation, Griffin (1997) proposed the notion of 'panexperiental
physicalism' as a third way - that is nondualistic interactionism, besides dualism and
materialism - to understand what experience is about. The approach outlined here has been




5. In an effort to get a grasp on the concept of experience, I will adopt an informational,
interactive, dynamic point of view on what chemistry and autonomously duplicating
chemistry (life) are. The reader is warned that the definitions and the approach below may
require some shifts in current thinking. Some patience is asked for. Again, this will be in the
first place a matter of redefining terms, especially by broadening concepts like experience,
interpretation, motivation, etc.
6. The use of concepts like experience and motivation (and many more) to describe processes
going on at the simplest (organic) chemistry level may seem anthropomorphic. Still, I would
like to remind that considering the use of these concepts for describing processes of limited
complexity as being an anthropomorphically biased approach can itself be regarded as
anthropocentric reasoning.
 
2.2. Experience at the molecular level: chemistry
7. Our use of the word 'matter' usually invokes the idea of inert pieces of substance, floating
around in space. In our minds, matter is different from interaction and action because we have
separate words for what is actually a continuum: no material interaction without matter, no
interesting material characteristics when trying to understand matter without interaction.
Dualistic reasoning is an implicit consequence of our basic terminology.
8. Indeed, only matter as in rocks or gold atoms is rather inert. These kinds of material
configuration are consequently of little interest to understand chemical reactions, living
processes, experience and consciousness. However, other species of atoms are naturally
engaged in interatomic interactions leading to continuous molecular reconfiguration. Since
this interaction occurs according to strict rules, certain atoms interact with only certain other
atoms. As a matter of fact, one can speak of interpretation: atoms interact with only certain
atoms out of the wide range of atoms present in the immediate environment. This means that
atoms have the capacity to recognize specific patterns. It could be stated that this specific
pattern recognition has to do with experience and that experience as such can be considered as
a basic characteristic of material interaction.
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9. One can ask why a molecule interacts with other - and only with certain other - molecules.
Again, one is tempted to apply terminology we usually apply only to describe behaviour of
animals and humans by asking: "What is the 'motivation' of molecules to behave in some
specific manner?". I will tackle these questions by considering enzymes, those special
interactive molecules which are a hallmark of living chemistry (just as much as nucleotide
strands are).
 
2.3. Experience at the enzymatic level
2.3.1. Enzymes are repetitive processors
10. The process of inorganic chemistry is generally a once-only event. Matter (two atoms or
molecules) is reconfigured and strong external forces (energy) will be necessary to let the
process occur again. One could say that the initial molecules (the substrates) were also the
processors, but due to their own processing activity these processors no longer exist. In the
case of an enzymatic molecule we have a device which can repeat the same process several
times (by the addition of a little external energy) without being changed physically. The
processor still exists after the processing, and flips back so that the process can be repeated.
The activity of the processor does not lead to its own destruction as is the case for inorganic
chemistry. We have a true processor, repetitively switching on and off, quite well comparable
to a transistor, a human made digital processor.
 
2.3.2. Experience as the matching of patterns
11. When the appropriate substrate is present in the immediate environment of an enzyme, it
is recognized by the active site of the enzyme and this leads to action, which is the processing
of the substrate into product and the subsequent release of the product. This also makes the
enzyme return to its receptive state. Enzymatic substrate recognition is specific pattern
recognition and - as I proposed to be the case for all other molecular interactions - one could
define experience as 'having to do with specific pattern recognition'. Or one could say that
experience has to do with 'the event of the matching of patterns'. This resembles strongly
perceptive experience as we know it (see paragraphs 36-41). Thus, when the preformed
recognition site of the enzyme meets its fitting pattern, there is experience. Experience is then
described as a characteristic of the interaction between processor and substrate. Experience
can be described in the same terms for e.g. cellular experience (paragraphs 19-24) and
experience of multicellular organisms (paragraphs 36-41).
12. Remark that this definition of experience as already a basic characteristic of molecular
interaction is in accordance with the following suggestion of Chalmers (1995):
"..., then experience must be more widespread than we might have believed, as information is
everywhere. This is counterintuitive at first, but on reflection I think the position gains a
certain plausibility and elegance. Where there is simple information processing, there is
simple experience, and where there is complex information processing, there is complex
experience. A mouse has a simpler information processing structure than a human and has
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correspondingly simpler experience" (p. 217).
 
2.3.3. Enzymes are interpreters
13. Again, we might define another concept at this level which is usually assumed to exist
only in complex organisms: interpretation. An enzyme must be able to tell at least the
difference between all possibly present molecules and the one very specific substrate upon
which it will act. Since enzymes pick out only one of many possible molecules, they interpret
the environment.
 
2.3.4. Enzymes are motivated and can be in different moods
14. Besides interaction, perceptive experience and interpretation, one can try to define
motivation and mood at this level of processing complexity, whereby mood could be defined
as the degree of specific motivation, the degree of motivation to undertake some specific
action. Being in a receptive state and having substrate in its immediate environment, an
enzyme is 'forced' to be active, it has no choice. This is motivation at its most crude
appearance. Remark that perception of the appropriate substrate (perceptive experience) is not
sufficient to let the enzyme undertake its typical catalytic behaviour. The enzyme must also be
in a given state, i.e. in the right mood. Given molecules of this type (enzyme and substrate),
the motivation for the process follows only from the combination of the experience of inside
drives (molecular tensions inside the molecule) and the experience of the presence of the right
substrate (perception).
15. The internal drive or mood may differ. Enzymes can find themselves in an activated status
(through phosphorylation by protein kinases) or in an inactivated status (through
dephosphorylation by phosphatases). Also, an enzyme may be in need of a specific co-enzyme
which may alter its conformation in such a way that it can exert its activity. One could say that
these events induce internal experiences (in the form of altered molecular tensions) which will
alter the mood of the enzyme and which will motivate or demotivate it to undertake action.
Similarly, cells and multicellular organisms will be motivated by the combination of internally
constructed pattern recognition demands and externally present, specifically fitting patterns.
The perception of food will induce animals to eat only when they are internally motivated by
a hungry mood - in other words, enzymes and animals have to be in the right mood to express
certain behaviours.
 
2.3.5. A possible explanation for the apparent transience of experience
16. What enzymes must experience is some specific environmental change, think of changing
electromagnetic fields due to the approach of an external molecule. Chemical and biological
experience might be intrinsically transient because it is a characteristic for describing the
dynamically, transient, temporary interaction between a specific processor and a specific
environmental change (e.g. the presence of the right substrate). So there is only experience
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when specific - pattern matching - conditions are met. It should be emphasized that the pattern
matching itself is not the experience. All one can say about experience is that 'it has to do
with' pattern recognition/matching. We will try to show below how this appears to be also the
case for aware experience (e.g. paragraphs 36-41).
17. This 'definition' of experience implicitly holds that experience is transient and thus might
offer a solution to the problem Chalmers had with his own suggestion (paragraph 12):
"..., then experience must be more widespread than we might have believed, as information is
everywhere. This is counterintuitive at first, ... Indeed, if experience is truly a fundamental
property, it would be surprising for it to arise only every now and then; most fundamental
properties are more evenly spread." (Chalmers 1995, p. 217)
 
2.3.6. Conclusion
18. I have tried to show how several concepts which we take to be concealed to the realm of
animal life could be defined already at the molecular level (anorganic and enzymatic).
Certainly enzymes could be regarded as devices which interprete the environment by picking
out only certain molecules and which can be in different moods, i.e. they can have different
degrees of motivation to act, driven by internal experience of intramolecular tensions. For
instance, when enzymes are not linked to certain co-enzymes or have not been activated, they
will not experience certain molecules as their possible substrates, while these same molecules
will be processed when the enzyme is in the proper mood. The kind of environmental
experience they can have and their behaviour will depend on internal configurations, i.e.
intramolecular tensions which we can consider as motivations. As such, asking: "How is it




19. We can now look at the multi-enzymatic processor, the cell. It should be noted that the
product(s) of one enzyme can be used as the substrate for other enzymes. Enzymes interact by
means of chemical molecules, whereby the product of one enzyme serves as the substrate for
another enzyme. In this manner, enzymes influence each others' behaviour, just like cells and
animals do. Such a community of enzymes, interacting with each other and with the
nucleotides (which are basically carriers of encoded information), embraced by a membrane,
is - roughly speaking - a cell.
20. Cells, just like enzymes, can respond to specific external molecules which connect to
receptors at the cell membrane. This is pattern matching between intercellular messenger
molecules and cell membrane receptors and we could consider this as cellular perceptive
experience. This will influence the internal behaviour of the cell, by inducing several
enzymatic cascades which would not be happening without the cellular perceptive experience.
The situation is comparable to enzymatic behaviour which is influenced by the matching of its
active site with the appropriate substrate, or with animals which will behave differently as
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influenced by different perceptions.
21. Just like enzymes, the reaction of cells depends also on their internal motivation. Cells
have to be in the right mood to respond. Neurons for instance will not always fire when the
same amount of dendrite neurotransmitter input is given. Much depends on which molecules
are connected to their membranes. For example, serotonin receptors are present on the
membrane (not in the synapses) and serotonin can enhance the responsiveness of the neuron.
Endorphins and enkephalins bind to opiate receptors on the membrane and inhibit neurons
that transmit pain impulses.
22. Remark that cells can also differ in their response to external stimuli depending on their
developmental stage. Maturating cells will respond to other molecules than mature cells
and/or activated cells, because the receptors expressed on their respective cell membranes
differ. This recalls somewhat the different behaviour of activated/nonactivated enzymes
(paragraph 15). Comparably, multicellular colonies like animals react differently to identical
stimuli, depending on the developmental stage they are in (paragraph 39).
23. Since the messenger molecules mostly come from other cells and since the products
resulting from cellular activity mostly will be recognized by other cells (to these other cells
these molecules are the observable, external behaviour of the first cells), cells can interact -
again reminiscent of enzymatic interaction - and may form complex ecological societies,
composed of several genetically related and unrelated cells. A special form of such a
community is the multicellular organism, which is composed of genetically identical cells. It
is a temporarily existing colony of clones produced by duplication of a single germ cell.
24. In conclusion, it is possible to describe cellular experience in the same terms we used for
enzymes, only there is more flexibility in the interactions and the whole system is somewhat
more complex and flexible. Cellular experience and behavior can be regarded as simply an
extension of the experiential and behavioral possibilities which exist already at the molecular
level, and below I argue how animal experience, i.e. awareness, is basically only a more




25. In what follows I will strictly avoid the use of the term 'consciousness'. Awareness and
consciousness are largely used as synonyms, but I will argue how awareness and
consciousness might be better understood by considering the latter as a special form of
awareness.
26. Native English speakers reading previous drafts of this manuscript have pointed to the odd
proposition that I, as a nonnative speaker, make above. Of course, one should regard this
proposition within the context of the philosophical debate on how we can understand
consciousness and it is not my intention to change linguistic habits - something which would
be impossible anyway. However, English, by the presence of two etymologically unrelated
terms, nicely offers the possibility to assign also different meanings to these words.
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Interestingly, it appears that English previously made the distinctions I am advocating here as
being more appropriate to structure the debate on consciousness. Indeed, 'aware' stems from
the Anglo-Saxon 'gewaer' (11th century) which meant something like 'being informed', 'to
know' from the 13th century onwards. I'd say the original meaning of awareness relates to the
having of experiences, the experiencing itself. The etymologic origin of 'consciousness' points
to a more restricted meaning. It is composed of the Latin words 'cum and sciere' and could be
translated as 'to know ABOUT', which points to some reflexive properties of consciousness,
that is to the considering of experiences. I will come back to this discussion after
considerations about the nature of awareness (paragraphs 56-58).
 
3.2. Awareness is what experience is to animals
27. It is generally agreed that plants are unaware organisms. Usually this difference is
explained by the fact that animals have neurons, and although neuronal circuitry is indeed
essential to animal awareness, this does not explain why neuronal circuitry should lead to
something like awareness. To understand what awareness is about we have to take into
account the special kind of situation animals find themselves in.
28. Animals can be defined as multicellular, heterotrophic, eukaryote colonies. Being a
heterotroph colony makes life rather complicated. The basic reason for the complications is
that, as a heterotroph, it is evolutionarily advantageous when the colony is able to move
towards the usually patchily distributed food like plants or pray. Of course, multiple sessile or
almost immobile animal species and life stages occur, as is the case for parasites or as is the
case in aquatic environments where food is mobile and can be filtered out of the water. This
kind of animal life is usually less complex (e.g. Porifera and Coelenterata in water and the
parasitic Cestoda tapeworms), which is an additional indication that the mobile animals need
to resolve more problems. Sexually reproducing animal colonies have to be able to move
towards potential sex partners, since these also will be moving around. Also, there are
predatory heterotroph multicellular colonies dwelling around, not feeding on plants but on
other animals and thus animals should be able to flee. In summary, animals have to be able to
move: towards e.g. food and potential sex partners and away from e.g. danger and annoying
conditions. As it turns out, the need for multicellular heterotroph colonies to be mobile is the
basic reason why muscles, nerves, perception organs, emotions, brains have turned out to be
advantageous characteristics during animal phylogeny. A first indication is that all of these
characteristics are lacking in plants and all or most in primary or secondary immobile animals.
29. It may be useful at this stage to summarize briefly some of the characteristics which
differentiate animals from most other living beings. For animals, perceptive experience - the
specific recognition of environmental patterns (be it food, partners, predators or behaviours of
other animals) - is of the utmost importance to optimize moving. Besides potent perception
capacities, animals - being multicellular colonies - will need special internal motivations to
behave as an individual organism. This could be considered as perception of the internal
metabolic state of the colony. These motivations to make the colony do the genetically right
things are basically hormonal or humoral in nature, i.e. emotional drives. Humours in turn are
nothing but the intercellular signalling molecules we addressed earlier. Once the colony has
perceived (e.g. food), and is in the right mood (for instance, being hungry) to be motivated by
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this perception, it will take action.
30. Most important with respect to understanding the development of awareness is the
development of neurons, which are simply cells specialized in enhancing the speed of
chemically intercellular signalling transforming the chemical signal received at the dendrites
into an electrical one so that intracellular transmission proceeds extremely fast, whereafter
transformation into a chemical signal occurs again at the axon. Neurons - with their
extraordinary number of branches and interconnections - enable the development of a nervous
system and of central processing of the experiences going on in the body. It is the central
processing which takes place in the brain which is crucial in understanding what awareness is
about. Other multicellular beings have no central processing of experiences.
 
3.3 Awareness is the experience which is the result of filtering and processing the
multiple possible bodily experiences
31. From neuroscientific and psycho-analytic studies it becomes clear that we are
'unconscious' about many events in our brains and bodies and this is generally called
'subconsciousness' (paragraphs 44-47). First I want to argue that what we call awareness is an
end stage experience which results from the filtering and processing of the several possible
experiences going on in our bodies and brains.
32. Many examples of unaware experiences can be given. Muscular proprioreception is going
on all of the time. It is about monitoring the elongation of muscles in order to enable
continuous muscular correction of bodily equilibrium. None of this experience (by the
monitoring processors) or action (by muscular contraction and relaxation) usually reaches
awareness. We are completely unaware of it. Also for perception, i.e. the capturing of
information from the outer world by smell, taste, touch, sound and vision, only a limited
number of the experiences of the perception cells and organs reaches the central experience
(final awareness) modules. This becomes clear when we realize that 'we' only experience a
limited amount of all the visual information present at each moment when our eyes are
opened. When reading these lines, your brain has already filtered out many visual signals
coming from the surroundings of the printed letters you look at. It is such a routine that this
information cannot reach awareness (unless written words like those above tell us to attend to
it). For instance, Crick & Koch (1995) suggest that most of the experience of visual signals in
the V1 region of the visual field of our brain never reaches higher order processing units. See
also Bridgeman (1992).
33. There may be several, mutually not exclusive reasons why we awarely experience, i.e.
become aware of, only a limited amount of all the experiencing of our body and brain. First,
too much information could cause chaos and costs energy and might ruin living processes by
making them chaotic (Kauffman 1995). Enzymes can have only one kind of experience. They
can recognize only one (combined) pattern. Cells can respond to several hundreds of different
molecules docking at their membranes, and the resulting cellular experiences and activity
therefore will not only be more complicated but also more flexible (more intelligent) than that
of individual enzymes. Still, cells deal with very specific molecules and are unable to
experience the presence of all those other molecules which do not fit their membrane
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receptors. Because of this selective blindness, there is a huge filtering out of all possible
information present in the environment. It can be hypothesized that the increasing problem of
filtering out ever larger amounts of experience may be an evolutionary explanatory reason
why filtering was a necessary development.
34. Second, only some of the experiences are of relevance to central processors. Most of the
information gathered by local bodily experience is not of importance to the functioning of the
animal for undertaking direct actions as a whole and therefore need not to be transmitted to
higher or the highest level processing centers. For many processes going on within the colony,
there is no functional reason at all why higher order processors should be informed, even
when the subsystem fails. In the example of visual perception, it is clear that our retina
receives all of the time environmental external information when awake, but only a very tiny
amount of e.g. all of the visual information reaching our retina is really of importance
(paragraphs 36-41).
 
3.4 How does the filtering takes place?
35. We may ask how it is decided, by which level of processing, when and which information
is to be let through to higher order processors and to the final processors (the awareness
modules). A good guess for routine physiological processes is to say that the higher order
processing modules will be activated when the routine processors at the lower levels cannot
handle things on their own and/or when action (e.g. moving) has to be taken involving the
whole colony and not the subsystem alone.
36. For perception of the environment we find back in a more elaborated form the situation as
explained for enzymes and cells whereby there is specific pattern matching between the active
site of the enzyme (a preformed pattern recognition site) and the substrate, or between the
membrane receptors of the cell and the fitting messenger molecules. Similarly, only certain
patterns will attract our attention and will be experienced. They elicit perceptual awareness.
Which patterns are of importance and should be reported to higher order processors, which
patterns fit our matching demands, depends on several cues, which are determined by
different mechanisms.
37. First, the patterns of importance may have been carved into our brains phylogenetically:
When we observe a curled branch on the ground while walking in the wood, we all of a
sudden may become aware of danger. It has been suggested that this experience is explainable
as an ancient fear of snakes. Similarly, biologically important patterns like potential partners,
food, ... will attract our attention.
38. Which patterns are of importance can also be acquired by 'education' during life. Young
animals can learn from the reactions of their parents and kin, which may be important to
recognize dangerous situations or to acquire social skills for instance by means of punishment
and reward. Drug dogs are trained/educated to observe specific smells, while their untrained
counterparts are more versatile in their smelling preferences. For humans, the pattern of
importance can also be instructed by words or it can be a word itself which attracts attention
because of special reminiscences.
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39. There are also developmental cues. Just as cells will respond differently to certain stimuli,
depending on their developmental stage (paragraph 22), so multicellular organisms respond
differently during their lives because of some hormonal developments which have taken
place. Think of the different developmental phases of worker bees or of the differences
between pre- and postpubertal humans.
40. Finally, which experiences are of importance will depend on present other internal
experiences (e.g. hungriness) which we can summarize as the mood of the colony. For
example, our interests are different when angry compared to when feeling great. A cat in a
lazy mood may just as well let a mouse pass by under its nose.
41. In summary, for animals, it is decided by phylogenetically given moulds (for instance
snake contours or attractiveness of sexual partners), developmental stage (for instance
changing interests while growing up), previous experiences (for instance habituation and
education), other current experiences (for instance the current state of internal motivation, like
being hungry or not) and the interaction among all of these, which pattern is to be perceived
or recognized, which experience is to become what we call aware experience.
42. It is probably about this discontinuity of perceptual experience that Chalmers was thinking
and not about the more fundamental discontinuity we assigned to experience as it can be
described at the molecular level. Basically there is not really a difference: when we accept that
experience is about pattern matching, the discontinuity of experience follows from the fact
that pattern matching occurs only now and then, whatever the complexity of the pattern
matching demands.
43. One might say that the distance between the first experiences which will lead to action
becomes larger during evolution (molecular, cellular, animal multicellular colony), with many
more possibilities for flexibility in between. The more complex the system, the more flexible
it is in setting out the patterns of importance - in combining different filters, the more adaptive
it is to the environment. The degree of responsive flexibility could be defined as intelligence.
 
3.5. Subawareness and final awareness
3.5.1. Subawareness or modular awareness
44. The model outlined above, whereby much processing and filtering of bodily and brain
experiences results in some final aware experience, fits with the model of the modular brain
(Gazzaniga, 1985; Gazzaniga, 1996; Bridgemann, 1992). Each of our brain modules has its
own input, processing and signalling specificities, in my words: each has its own experiences
and makes its own interpretations and decisions. As was the case for enzymes and cells, the
behaviour of lower order modules forms the experiences of higher order modules. Thus a lot
of information will be processed without the higher order processors necessarily being
informed about it. Because most of what is going on in our (body and) brain remains hidden
from the final awareness module(s), we would never have known about it without the
knowledge gathered by e.g. psycho-analysis and neuroscience.
45. For example, in split brain patients - as studied by e.g. Gazzaniga (1985), the mute brain
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hemisphere was able to answer questions by taking action, although it could not report to the
speaking (aware) brain half. Obviously information had been perceived and processed, and
this could activate motor modules to undertake the appropriate motoric responses. This seems
to be full awareness. However, since no report to the speaking brain hemisphere could be
made, the patient was unaware of this. Thus, awareness of brain modules and hemispheres,
which even leads to appropriate responses, seems to be possible without the subject's
awareness, in other words without final awareness.
46. Another example is the phenomenon of blindsight. Here lesions exist in certain fields of
the visual cortex. Although it appears that parts of the brain of these people is aware of certain
perceptions of the retina, this does not lead to awareness: people think they don't get any
information from the retina, although they score about average when asked to locate objects
perceived visually. The same phenomenon has been described for animals, whereby it could
also be shown that these animals as subjects are not aware of what their brain knows (Cowey
& Stoerig, 1995). With blindsight, it appears that there is no final or subjective awareness
possible because one of the basic modules is not getting the required information, and/or
cannot send through its information. Still the brain experiences, processes and takes decisions
'unconsciously' or subawarely.
47. One could describe the experiences of each brain module as its awareness, and maybe we
can name this better subawareness (instead of unawareness or subconsciousness).
 
3.5.2. Final awareness
48. The idea that an interpreter module exists has been suggested by Gazzaniga (1985). I'd
prefer to call this the final interpreter module(s), since interpretation could already be said to
exist at the enzymatic level at least and it could be said that each brain module has the ability
to interprete incoming signals, e.g. as whether these are to be transferred to higher order
modules.
49. From the above examples, it occurs that final awareness becomes possible only when
certain essential lower order inputs are provided to one or more final awareness modules. This
suggests that what is usually labelled as 'consciousness' is the experience of some final
interpreter module(s), i.e. final awareness. When this final interpreter module(s) lack certain
information from the submodules, subjects cannot become aware of what certain modules in
the brain have experienced and know.
50. Gazzaniga (1985) assumes that the 'interpreter module' has to do with language. Since
animals are certainly aware organisms - also because subaware activity has been shown in
animals (paragraph 46) - this seems unlikely. Still, this interpretation of Gazzanigga (1985)
may be understandable: in most humans the experience of the final interpreter - the aware
experience - will be automatically translated into words, such that it appears that it is in the
more recently developed language centers that the final interpretation is done.
51. One could define awareness as the final experience of the brain resulting from filtering by
a modular brain - by means of several strongly interacting criteria (which can be phylogenetic
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or developmental and which depend on current internal motivations, previous experiences,
environmental cues, etc.). From this definition it follows that for animals awareness is the
only possible form of experience when awake (Note 1). Hence, another possible reason for the
confusion between experience and awareness: experience can be understood as both a more
fundamental concept of nature and as the specific animal form of it, awareness - which for




52. In what follows, I will consider consciousness as a specific form of awareness, just as we
considered awareness as the specific animal form of experience. I will try to show how this
distinction enables us to address the first person - third person problem more easily, just as we
tried to show how the distinction between experience as a general concept and awareness as a
specific form of experience allows us to consider the hard problem of aware experience as the
hard problem of experience as a general concept. These ideas will be developed from the
same evolutionary approach used above, by arguing how it is basically because of recently
evolved linguistic capacitities that a new form of experience, conscious experience, became
possible.
53. I should hurry to explain how ascribing consciousness - or rather, as will become clear, the
possibility for conscious experience - to humans only, does not put humans on a higher ethical
platform than animals. It should be clear from what precedes that animals do feel (i.e. can
have different very deep emotional experiences), think (i.e. can consider different options
before taking action) and know (i.e. can have the experience of certainty). They are aware
emotional beings that can suffer and enjoy. As a matter of fact our ethical responsability
towards their physical and psychological well being is as large as our responsability towards
newborns and young children. For children as well as animals the experiences are absolute
(here and now (Donaldson, 1992)) - without any possible comfort or support from relativizing
considerations as they are available to grown-up humans. While we have no problems in
feeling compassionate for the discomfort of children, because we realize that their experiences
are absolute, it is rather strange that most of us do not recognize that for many animals these
same considerations should be kept in mind: when they suffer, suffering is what they are.
 
4.2. Symbolic language and human awareness
54. Having said this, the argument for considering consciousness as a specific, recently
evolved form of aware experience goes as follows. Awareness combined with language offers
several emergent possibilities, of which "human awareness" and consciousness are some
(Note 2). One could state that symbolic language is the only basic difference that science has
left as a distinction between humans and animals (Note 3). Besides its role in refined
communicaton and increased thinking capacities (leading to human awareness (paragraph 55),
symbolic language offers the ability to store experiences in our brain in still a different code
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and at a separate place from those places where experiences themselves are stored. Important
here is that words provide us with an internal separate frame of reference, which enables us to
take distance of what is going on and which offers the possibility of conscious experience
(paragraphs 56-58).
55. Am I conscious, while I am writing this article and searching all possible corners of my
mind for the right words and for useful insights by recombining information I have read,
heard, stored before? I would say I am not. I am trying to solve problems in the present, using
all the skills at my disposition - including my linguistic and educationally acquired skills, just
as cats use all their native and learned skills when solving the problem of how to catch a
mouse. Just like animals, I try to tackle current problems aided (or disturbed) by stored
previous aware experiences and knowledge and by comparing different outcomes. Except for
the usage of words, there is no difference with animal awareness. Humans simply can
consider more possibilities because of better developed mental representation capacities and
because of words. This is in my opinion human awareness, not consciousness. Both humans
and animals are aware beings in these situations, neither of them is conscious.
 
4.3. Consciousness can be defined as reflexive awareness
56. I will argue that the concept of consciousness is better restricted to some other
phenomenon, which - like human awareness - also needs both the activitity of the final
interpreter module(s), leading to aware experience or awareness, and language. I suggest to
define consciousness as 'reflexive awareness', i.e. some kind of experience which is possible
because symbolic language enables us to take distance of the current aware experience, and to
observe it as if we were a third person looking at ourselves.
57. The distinction I want to point to, may become clear when considering the kind of aware
or conscious questions we can ask. I can ask about the past: 'How did I get there last time?',
which is an aware practical question, BUT I also can ask: 'How did it feel like to be there two
years ago?', whereby I consciously wonder about previous experiences. About the future, I
can awarely ask 'Which road shall I take next time?' in an effort to prevent possible future
problems, BUT I can also consciously ask 'Will I like it there just as much as last time?',
reflecting upon the possible future experiences theirselves. In present time, one has to be
somewhat more careful in discerning awareness from reflexive awareness. Both the
expressions: 'Which is the right road now?' and 'I like driving here' are about awareness,
whereby the latter is simply a linguistic translation/expression of a current experience. BUT I
also can wonder: 'Isn't it strange that I am driving a car?' or 'Why do I like driving a car?',
which both are reflexive activities and make me conscious of what I am doing.
58. From this it follows that we have the possibility of being conscious, but that most of the
time we are not, being aware 'only'. On the contrary, most of our lives are spent while being
aware of what is going on, which enables us to respond and react appropriately, but we are not
conscious, since we do not use our ability to take distance.
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4.4. The first person - third person problem
59. This more restricted definition of consciousness - as a language dependent possibility to
consider the experience of being aware - immediately enables us to address the first person -
third person problem in a rather simple manner. Having experiences, i.e. being aware, I am
first person, very similar to what happens to an enzyme, a cell or a bat. Thinking about these
experiences (and those of others), I am third person, I am conscious. Since this 'thinking
about' is an experience itself, this puts me back in the first person. Of course, our ability to
take distance can go on and this will be an experience itself each time, so we can easily
imagine thinking about "the experience of thinking about an experience", i.e. thinking about
conscious experience. This could be compared to a camera observing a TV and representing
its recording on the same TV. The result is a TV representing its own when representing its
own when representing ...
60. In both first person and third person modus we make use of words. In first person modus
verbal reporting is nothing but an extension of the 'being aware' process, it is a translation in
symbols of the experience itself. In third person modus, words are used differently. Now they
function to take distance from the present experience and to consider it as an outside observer.
Defined in this manner, first person experience is aware experience, third person experience is
conscious experience.
61. Related to the first person - third person problem is the kind of experience (aware or
conscious) we will be studying when asking questions to subjects. When we ask: 'Did you see
object x?', we ask about retrieval of stored experience and we are studying awareness. When
we ask 'How did this electric pulse feel?', we address the nature of the experience, we ask for
considerations about the experience itself and are studying consciousness.
 
4.5. Cutting at the joints
62. I have tried to explain how experience might be described as an intrinsic characteristic of
(at least) certain biochemical processes. To speak of the awareness or consciousness of an
enzyme, a cell or a plant however, is something different (for a discussion of 'plant
consciousness', see Nagel (1997)). Doing so, we end up with awareness and consciousness
(complex higher order experiences as they became possible with ongoing evolution) as being
intrinsic characteristics of the universe - some cosmic force, which leads to dualism. Recall
that we opted for a nondualistic interpretation by assigning simple experiential events to
simple interactive systems (paragraph 7).
63. Awareness can be restricted to organisms which rely on central neuronal processing of
bodily and environmental experiences, i.e. to animals. I propose that a similar distinction is
possible between animals and humans. Animals can feel and animals can know, that is they
can have the aware experience of feeling certain about something. But they cannot know that
they know, they cannot know that they feel. To animals 'knowing' is possible (it is an aware
experience), 'knowing of' (conciousness) is not, because an independent frame of reference is
lacking.
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64. Although we propose that a clear cut is possible between consciousness and awareness,
cutting at the joints is not always easy. After all, complexity increase is mostly a rather
gradual development - think of brain development and intelligence increase during animal
phylogeny from snails and worms to dolphins, magpies, ... and humans. Still, it is now widely
accepted that, besides gradual evolution, 'symbiosis' - the merging of two unrelated lineages
of doing things -, like that between protein and DNA (leading to the genetically encoded cell),
or between the 'urkaryote' and the bacterial ancestors of the mitochondria (leading to the
eukaryote cell) or between animal emotional awareness and symbolic sounds (leading to
human awareness and the possibility for consciousness) can cause sudden jumps in evolution,
and cause clearcut differences (see also Note 2).
 
5. Mystic experience
65. Besides aware experience, conscious experience, dream experience (see Note 1), there is
also something like mystic experience. Mystic experience has been described as a purely
emotional manner of experiencing and furthermore as an experience whereby there is no
'locus of concern' within space/time, that is that there are no 'here and/or now', 'there and/or
then', 'somewhere and/or sometime' experiences, but only 'out of space-time' experience
(Donaldson, 1992).
66. I think that mystic experience actually boils down for the most part to some kind of animal
experience of direct intensive total mental joy, an experience to which we have had no access
for a long time, because of the immediate interference of mental representation and words
when we do have aware experience. Except for mystic experience, wordless enjoyment seems
an impossibility to us because we will feel the need to express our joy ("Isn't this beautiful?")
and/or try to explain why the 'I' enjoys ("I especially like the way this artist does x, because y
and z"), forgetting to 'just' enjoy. This coincides with the point of view of William James,
who: "... a century ago, pointed out that mystical experience is not so much invoking higher
powers or other realms but losing, albeit briefly, one's own identity." (citation taken from
Blackmore (1994)).
67. It is therefore maybe not coincidental that inadvertent spontaneous mystic experience such
as is occasionally possible to Westerners seems to occur most frequently (which probably
means 'most easily') when people are subject to deeply emotional and direct experience of
nature itself, when nothing really important is bothering their mind (my interpretation of
examples given by Donaldson (1992)). Eastern cultures have developed numerous techniques
- basically aimed at stopping thinking and stopping thinking in words - to evoke mystic
experience more easily. There is a more original typically human manner to evoke mystic
experience. It is dancing and trancing, which appears to be a standard part of rituals and social
behaviour in most native cultures.
 
6. Zombie experience and artificial consciousness
68. Can computers have experience? When we defined experience as being apparent at
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already the level of simple matter (paragraph 8) and enzymes (paragraph 11), we should state
that transistors (on/off devices) can have experience as well. It appears that besides
electromagnetic experience as it occurs in biochemical and neuronal processes, a new kind of
experience, electronic experience, has been developed by the scientific activity of humanity.
Yes, computers have experience.
69. Since a computer responds to input and gives as the output what appears to be a
centralized final calculation of all submodular calculations, the computer is aware when we
apply the above definition of awareness. Computer awareness evolves rapidly: pocket
calculators have the experiential complexity of a snail compared to current computers which
can talk to us. Similarly, growing complexity of brains made increase aware experiential
flexibility. Especially now that we start equipping computers with the possibility of coping
with visual and auditory input, the resemblance to awareness of living organisms increases.
According to the definitions given, computers or AI machines do experience and - since there
is central processing - have aware experience when sufficiently complex.
70. Are computers conscious? No doubt we can program computers to consider not the result
of the input and the calculation, in other words to consider the knowledge, the information
which results from experience, but also the event of the input - the experience - itself. This
must not be that difficult since computers use language and thus have the ability for
reflexiveness. When they are able to consider the experiences themselves or the fact that they
have experiences, computers are conscious according to the above definitions. Will computers
one day be aware and conscious? According to the definitions I suggest here, they are already
or will be no doubt.
71. Is claiming that machines have or can have experience, awareness and consciousness the
same as claiming that there is no difference between computers and living beings? I think that
again the distinction we tried to make between experience on the one hand and
awareness/consciousness on the other hand enables us to explain where the difference really
lies. The discussion is not about whether processors, organisms or systems can become aware
or conscious, but whether the underlying experience is comparable. Although computers can
be aware and conscious, this experience will compare in no way to the aware and conscious
experience which is possible in animals and humans respectively.
72. The most probable reason for this difference is that the basic experiences in bodies and
brains (hormonal and interneuronal signalling) are of a different nature than the basic
experiences of computers (signalling between transistors). Maybe the most important reason
is something which has been clear to many students of living organisms for a long time, but
which has always been overlooked, avoided or denied by science: animals and humans are
emotional organisms in the first place (Vaneechoutte, 1993). This trivial insight is fortunately
and finally finding more and more acceptance. According to the hypothesis of Antonio
Damasio (1994), emotion pervades and underlies aware reactions even more deeply than was
believed by those of us who were already convinced of its importance.
73. So, we might also get a grip on the zombie discussion by stating that zombies and
computers can indeed be defined as aware and possibly conscious 'beings', but that their
awareness and consciousness is of a different kind from ours, because they deal with a
different kind of experiencing, that is insentient or nonemotional experiencing. Only in the
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case that we could program emotionality into computer brains might it be possible that one
day computers might have aware and conscious experiences comparable to ours. Theoretical
work on how 'appraisive knowledge' could be programmed into computers so as to lead to
'emotional' behaviour has already been formulated (Gudwin & Gomide 1997). Others say that
the objectives of an AI system could be put to 'please human beings' or to 'pay attention to
approval and disapproval of human beings' (Walter Fritz, personal communication).
 
7. Experience and experiences
74. We end up with many classes of experience: molecular biochemical experience, cellular
experience, subaware brain module experience, final aware experience, language dependent
conscious experience, dream experience, mystic experience and AI or zombie experience.
75. Just as mystic experience might be understood as pure direct emotional animal experience,
so we can understand zombie experience as the experience which is possible for emotionless,
insentient machines. They are just different experiences, by definition. We cannot know what
the world of AI experience is like, just like most of us cannot imagine what mystic experience
is about. The experiences of a bat, for which the world is composed of sonar images in air,
will be different from the experiences of a dolphin, for which the world is 'seen' as sonar
images in water, or from those of land animals which use vision and sound in air, etc. And all
of these will be impossible to imagine to a human mind. We may come closest to
understanding how it must be to be some other human being, simply because we are most
alike. Still, all of this can be considered as aware experience, while no one can really
understand how it must be like to be another being. This coincides with the vision of the mind
as the product of the interaction of brain, body and environment, whereby there is not really a
mind-body duality. As such, the world view of a mind is a specific reflection of the very
specific combination of physical and environmental present and past experiences of an
individual colony or system.
 
8. Summary
76. In summary, experience can be considered as a basic characteristic of material interaction
starting (at least) at the level of enzymatic processes. Understanding what experience is about
is a hard problem. All I can offer as a way to an answer is that it has to do with pattern
recognition or pattern matching, which explains the transiency of experience. The essence of
animal awareness is that it is the final experience possible when experiences are first
processed in a central brain, and as such awareness is the most frequent experience possible at
the animal level. On this view, in nature only animals can be regarded as possibly aware
beings.
77. Human awareness is an extension of animal awareness by the possibility of storing
information in an independent manner, by means of words (linked to mental representations).
It makes us much better able to retrieve events in the past, it offers the new possibility to
consider events in the future and it enables us to consider many more possible outcomes of
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present events. It also enables us to translate present experiences into words. Words also may
be used to construct imaginary (virtual) situations in which we can have vivid (as if) aware
experiences.
78. This is not to be confused with the use of words for imagining how experiences were, are
or could be and which I suggest to define as having to do with consciousness. Consciousness
then is the ability, again offered by language, to consider the experiences themselves: how
were events experienced in the past, what will events feel like in the future, how do others
experience things. In the present tense we can wonder about the experiences we are having or
wonder about the fact that we have experiences - which again should not be confused with the
aware activity of reporting present experience. For example, saying 'I like this' is aware
activity, while saying 'Quite surprising that I like this' is conscious activity.
79. While awareness is (animal) experience, conciousness can be defined as the experience
which stems from considering experiences, or as reflexive awareness (third person activity).
Conscious activity itself is awarely experienced, which puts us back in first person modus.
Besides these pitfalls, I think the basic confusion in many discussions on consciousness stems
from taking these specific animal and human experiences to be the only kind of experience
possible, overlooking that experience is an intrinsic feature of the interaction between matter.
80. I have tried to argue how evolutionary, dynamic reductionism may enable us to some
degree to distinguish between experience, awareness and consciousness. I conclude for myself
that there are no philosophical problems about awareness and consciousness. Mechanistically,
aware and conscious activity can indeed be considered as explained (Dennett 1991). However,
I think that explaining how these experiences feel like and why it should feel like something,
is not within the realm of our methods of understanding. To me this comes as no surprise,
since I consider our lack of understanding of the nature of experience as a consequence of the
evolutionary limitations of our individual animal minds, developed to think in terms of cause
and consequence. We should adopt some modesty in these matters. After all, also our basic
laws are merely descriptive: they enable prediction, but they do not explain why things are the
way they are. The physical laws which science has revealed, give us a false impression of
basic understanding, while these laws only reflect some generalities, without explaining why
these generalities are the way they are. We can describe under what conditions two molecules
will interact and predict to which new molecule this will lead. We describe how it happens,
but we do not understand why this happens.
81. I hope that this approach may provide a manner for making elementary distinctions
between experience, awareness and conciousness and that it may offer a way to a renewed
constructive debate between those researchers and philosophers who find themselves at




82. Note 1. Of course there is also dreaming experience during sleep. One could say that
dreaming activity occurs during every normal sleep, but that we experience dreams only
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sporadically (some even report to have never dream experiences). My guess is that this dream
experience stems from 'partial awakeness', i.e. a state of being whereby some of the modules
which are otherwise inactivated during sleep regain activity. This might occur because of
environmental conditions (think of noises), because of malfunctioning of some organs during
sleep (think of apnoea) or because of the emotional impact of the dreams themselves, which
alert some modules otherwise 'asleep'. At those moments we are able to witness the
complexity and the seeming chaos of the interpretation processes of lower order modules in
the absence of our final interpretation capacities. (To humans there is also conscious
experience and mystic/religious/hallucination experience. For a preliminary attempt at
classification, see paragraphs 54-61, 85 and 65-67).
83. Note 2. As a matter of fact, there is nothing nondeterministic about the enigmatic word
'emergence' (Nagel 1961) - also 'supervenience'. Instead of stating that the sum is more than
the parts (a quantititave approach, which is not applicable), we might better understand
emergence by saying that the qualities of the combination are different from the qualities of its
constituent parts (a qualitative approach).
84. Combining two different processes, like i) being an emotional animal and ii) speaking -
can lead to predictable emergent outcomes. i) An animal has emotions which have been
naturally selected because they enable appropriate behaviour needed to survive and reproduce
(paragraph 29). ii) A certain animal species (the human animal) is able to speak and thus to
think about future possible events (like death) and future possible emotional experiences (like
how it will feel to be dead). An almost inevitable outcome of i) and ii) together is that these
animals will develop behaviour which is meant to influence the assumed afterdeath events and
emotional experiences. As such, one could say that the worldwide occurrence of
independently developed burial rituals is a predictable emergent outcome of the combining of
emotion and speech in a single organism.
85. The recurrent need throughout our history and at present of most humans to believe in the
existence of divine powers (religiosity) can be explained starting from the same
considerations (Vaneechoutte 1993) and as such religiosity becomes a subject for scientific
studies, pace those who claim that science has nothing to say about religion. While science
cannot proof or disproof the nonexistence of deity, it can wonder what it is in the human mind
that makes so many of these minds convinced of something for which absolutely no trace can
be found when applying the otherwise very efficient scientific methods.
86. Note 3. However, even the exclusivity of symbolic language for humans may be
questionable, since we still have very little idea of the degree of symbolisation of the sonar
languages of e.g. dolphins and bats or of the infrasound language of elephants.
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